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Abstract 
  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been deemed as the most 
successful regional grouping in the history of Southeast Asia, most notorious for its 
achievement in creating and maintaining peace and stability in the region comprising 10 
countries with vastly diverse political, economic and socio-cultural background. The 
territorial claims concerning South China Sea by four ASEAN countries (Brunei 
Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines and Viet Nam) against China remains the most 
pressing challenge for the region up to the present day. While ASEAN has taken up the 
issue under its multilateral framework in which ASEAN and China have been working 
towards a code of conduct in South China Sea, it is found that ASEAN itself is inconsistent 
in its position when it comes to South China Sea as evident in its political stance through 
its annual statement and communique. Such inconsistency is in line with various critics 
on ASEAN’s informal and weak institutionalisation due to its lack of sense of regional 
belonging. As ASEAN itself has repeatedly emphasises the need of ASEAN centrality in 
regional and international set up, the foresaid issue is inarguably a testament to ASEAN 
centrality. Taking into account that the conduct of ASEAN depends very much on its 
annually rotated chairmanship, in which the chair has the responsibility to ensure ASEAN 
centrality, this thesis aims to investigate how a country’s national identity affect its regional 
identity under ASEAN’s regionalism with regard to the South China Sea issue through 
ASEAN chairmanship. To this end, this thesis investigates how Myanmar, Malaysia and 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), as ASEAN chairs in 2014, 2015 and 2016, 
respectively, led ASEAN in achieving a common position on South China Sea and how 
prominent are their national identities in their undertakings.  
 
 
Keywords: ASEAN, centrality, chairmanship, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, South China 
Sea  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, RESEARCH QUESTION AND ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
I.1 Introduction 
  
The territorial claims in the South China Sea involving four ASEAN countries 
namely Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Viet Nam and the Philippines against China has 
been claimed as threatening to the security and stability in Southeast Asia, which is a 
much needed condition for ASEAN Community building and consolidation given the main 
role of the organisation to preserve stability and prosperity in the region. ASEAN as the 
main regional framework in the region has taken up the issue under its multilateral 
framework with a view to achieving a code of conduct (COC) in South China Sea. 
Repeatedly, ASEAN has claimed not taking sides in the territorial claims in the South 
China Sea but supports the peaceful resolution of disputes among claimants in 
accordance with universally-recognised principles of international law, including 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), without resorting to threat 
or force. It also consistently promotes the full and effective implementation of the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), as an instrument 
agreed by both ASEAN and China established since 2002. 
However, inconsistency particularly during 2014-2016 in ASEAN’s position could 
be identified from its annual statement and communique. The said political documents 
reflected the changing position of ASEAN through recognition of ongoing developments 
on the ground, omission of certain language and expression towards particular 
expectation. It is important to note that its annual chairman’s statement is under the 
prerogative of ASEAN chair and its joint communique is a negotiated document. To this 
end, ASEAN’s chairmanship highlights the paradox between national interest and 
regional position, which resonates with major critic addressed to ASEAN on lacking 
regional sense of belonging. 
This thesis investigates how the three chairmanships approached and formulated 
ASEAN’s position on South China Sea based on their respective national identities 
juxtaposed with regional identity and regionalism, in order to answer whether national 
identities affect ASEAN’s common position on South China sea. National identity is 
defined through a country’s political conduct, culture and international position while 
regional identity attributes to ASEAN’s norms and principle. Regionalism is seen as an 
outcome or result of the interaction process between national and regional identity. This 
thesis concludes that the way a country chairs the organisation, through its policy and 
conduct, is affected by the country’s national identity, which lays the basis of how a 
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country perceives itself inwardly and positions itself outwardly. Their respective national 
identities also affect the way they see, interpret and use their relations within and with 
ASEAN. 
I.2 Institutional Background 
The confirmation of Southeast Asia region as a political entity through ASEAN is 
often looked with disdain by scholars and academics, as they mostly are of the view that 
ASEAN remains a rhetoric phenomenon filled with political statements and zero 
implementation. Despite the critics that ASEAN is imperfect, ineffective and mostly 
unwieldy given its present-day overlapping agendas and mechanisms, it remains one of 
the most recognisable and durable regional intergovernmental organisations in the world 
encompassing three key dimensions: regional peace and security, economic integration 
and institution building with the goal of advancing the prosperity and well-being of the 
peoples (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017).  
ASEAN has impressively grown in scope, practice and expectation as it went 
through many hardships; originally established in 1967 by only five members, it is no 
longer a group of post-colonial countries that strive to get acknowledgement of their 
sovereignties; rather, it is a group of 10 that is at the pinnacle of regionalism in its 50 
years of establishment. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration with which the five countries were 
proclaimed as an official regional grouping underlined the basic objectives of living under 
a peaceful, stable region through the use of peaceful dispute mechanism rather than use 
of force and further, work together for common interests and purposes (Severino, 2008). 
ASEAN’s core modalities are crystallised in its 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC) which emphasised the principles of non-intervention, non-interference, sovereignty 
and peaceful settlements of disputes. Thus, the most important success of ASEAN has 
been the maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia by promoting peaceful 
relations among its Member States.  
For ASEAN, the South China Sea remained a major concern and a litmus test for 
the supposedly regional rules-based order. Four ASEAN claimant countries namely 
Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines and Viet Nam have wrangled with China over 
the resource-rich South China Sea in a territorial spat that has been disrupting the so-
called peaceful Southeast Asia for decades. There are inherent disputes over claims to 
land features and maritime territories in the South China Sea, viz. (1) between China and 
Vietnam over the Paracels archipelago; (2) among China, Viet Nam and, partially, the 
Philippines and Malaysia, over the Spratlys Islands; and (3) Philippines’ claim over the 
Reed Bank and Scarborough Shoal (Severino, 2016) (Emmers, 2010). Brunei 
Darussalam, on the other hand, does not ascertain to any land features in the South 
China Sea but to some sea lines where its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) spans, which 
covers significant shore and fisheries zone (Severino, 2016). On China’s part, its historical 
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claim of nine-dash Line encompassing practically all South China Sea1 has made the 
conflicts even more complicated and highly debatable. Other than the strategic position 
of the Sea that is highly desirable, the resources at stakes for the claimant states include 
their EEZ, fisheries scope and other potential resources, other than the obvious like oil, 
such as hydrocarbon (Weatherbee, 2012).  
South China Sea territorial claims, CSIS (DW, 2017) 
Southeast Asia claimants have insisted that this is a regional issue as it threatens 
not only peace and stability of the region, but also ASEAN’s unity. However, ASEAN 
chose to deal with the issue through dialogue and consultation process with China given 
the nature of the organisation that prioritises pacific settlement of dispute hence it does 
not, and will not, form a military alliance (Dupont, 2014), which many see discouraging as 
the decades-long negotiation has yet to yield any significant result with the 2002 DOC 
signed by all ASEAN Member States and China, as the only notable outcome. The DOC, 
constituting a significant instrument in promoting trust, confidence building and 
cooperation in the South China Sea for both ASEAN and China serves as a foundation 
for the conclusion of a code of conduct. The DOC also includes adherence to the 
international law including the 1982 UNCLOS in which all claimants of the South China 
Sea disputed features and waters are parties to the said convention. 
                                                      
1 The line which is based on a historical claim provides a justification for territories that China thinks belong to its 
sovereignties generated by the lines, including any corresponding maritime zones (e.g., territorial sea and EEZ or 
continental shelf) (Tsirbas, 2016) 
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Nevertheless, ASEAN’s and China’s efforts to implement the DOC and adopt a 
COC have produced few substantive results. The conclusion of the COC has already 
taken more than 15 years of negotiation. Particularly over the recent years, the adoption 
of more aggressive tactics for exercising rights by all claimants especially China is 
alarming which is opposed to what has been agreed under the DOC. China itself is often 
quoted to prefer bilateral track rather than deal with ASEAN as a group. This accentuates 
the gap between the ongoing discussion under diplomatic track and reality at sea, putting 
the status quo between ASEAN and China at risk. As a result, the tensions and 
developments in the South China Sea have damaged the confidence-building between 
and among ASEAN members and China (Graham, 2014). Although ASEAN has acted as 
a regional multilateral mechanism for dispute management, the failure of responding 
towards aggressive moves at sea by claimants created an impression that ASEAN is 
incapable and ineffective in keeping the tension at ease, let alone reaching a formal 
consensus between the parties all due to its rather informal institutionalism (International 
Crisis Group, 2012); (Ba, 2014). ASEAN is known to always take a neutral position on 
this issue and while there has been no noticeable change in this stated position, there 
has been many inconsistencies (Nguyen, 2015); (Parameswaran, 2016); (Jenner & Thuy, 
2016) over many of its official statements, for instance on the mentioning of the 2016 
Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in either Chairman’s Statements or Joint 
Communiques. Further, there existed different opinions within ASEAN itself in agreeing 
to a common proposal as part of concluding a COC, e.g. finding a unified position on the 
application of certain mechanisms, or even the inherent claims disputed among the 
countries (Amer, 2014). As a result, ASEAN does not project itself as a one regional body 
with a common position on critical issues, hence putting Southeast Asia’s regional peace 
and stability at risk. 
The intra-ASEAN struggle demonstrates that in order to formulate an ASEAN 
common position towards the South China Sea, it is not only the views and interests of 
ASEAN claimant states that need to be settled, but also the 10 countries as a group or, 
using ASEAN’s language, the need for ASEAN centrality. As stipulated in the ASEAN 
Charter, a legally binding agreement which provides ASEAN’s legal status and 
institutional framework as well as codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values, it is incumbent 
upon the chair of ASEAN to, among others, ensure ASEAN centrality which translated to 
the ability of ASEAN to be able to settle and reflect on a common position on critical issues 
that affects its safety and security as a whole (Ganguly, Scobell, & Liow, 2017). The 
chairmanship of ASEAN rotates annually based on alphabetical order in which member 
state assuming the chairmanship shall bear the responsibilities to chair and manage 
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ASEAN’s operation and decision-making bodies.2 ASEAN’s chairmanship, then, 
highlights the paradox of national versus regional interests; the chair has to fulfil its 
responsibility to realise regional interest while not undermine its own national interest and 
during the process, it has often diluted the organisation’s common stance (Son & Jenner, 
2016). Vested national interests often causes the chair to not fully discharge its 
responsibilities properly – for example the failure to produce Foreign Ministers’ Joint 
Communique under Cambodia’s chairmanship in July 2012 with regard to the South 
China Sea, allegedly serving Cambodia’s national interests by giving a lower profile to the 
issue in order to keep the said country’s stable relations with China. South China Sea 
aside, ASEAN countries also possess varying degree of prominence in their relations with 
China (Ba, 2014) which affect the kind of regional responses prioritised, factoring as 
another dimension of the intra-ASEAN process that affects how ASEAN Member States 
individually perceive China along with its policies and actions towards them. 
To this end, this thesis will investigate the coherence of ASEAN’s approach on this 
issue under three chairmanships that attributed to significant differences: Myanmar’s 
military rule chairing ASEAN for the first time (2014); Malaysia as one of ASEAN’s 
founding fathers as well as a claimant state (2015); and Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (PDR) as a socialist republic (2016). In doing so, this thesis will see the interplay 
between national identities of the three countries and ASEAN regional identity during their 
capacities in discharging responsibilities of ASEAN chair with the understanding that 
national and regional interests would only derive on how a country perceive its national 
and regional identities under the auspices of ASEAN regionalism. 
 
I.3 Methodology 
 
 I.3.1 Analytical framework 
To answer the question whether national identities of Myanmar, Malaysia and Lao 
PDR, as the chairs of ASEAN in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively, affect ASEAN’s 
common position on the issue of South China Sea, this thesis will utilise the concept of 
national identity to scrutinize the elements beyond state-to-state relations and hence, 
understand a country’s worldview and put them together with regional identity. The 
interplay between national identity and regional identity is further analysed through 
regionalism concept, which provides the framework mechanism of regional governance 
that serves as both means and ends in producing collective output. This thesis will also 
                                                      
2 Among others, the ASEAN Summit and related summits, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the three ASEAN 
Community Councils, relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and senior officials, and the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives. 
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analyse the process and elements involved under the undertaking of an organisation’s 
chairmanship. 
 
I.3.2 Concepts 
a. National Identity 
Identity, in principle, is defined as the underlying basis for a collective action, either 
under a social standing or political realms that marks how a group identifies common 
signifier among its members that in the end produce a sense of “we-ness” or a particular 
discourse about the group (Lebow, 2008). National identity, in this regard, could be 
understood as an individual understanding towards a person’s sense of belonging to a 
state or nation under a cohesive unit of a nationhood that is represented by particular 
traditions, culture, language or even political conduct (Smith, 1991). Under political realm, 
national identity then entails a sense of responsibilities to its member through rights and 
obligations under a definite formal territory; this is what defined a nation as a community 
of people complying to the same laws and institutions within a bounded territory (Smith, 
1991).  
However, once one moves from political understanding, national identity becomes 
an abstract, fluid conception and multidimensional construct; its meaning is dependent 
upon the way it is used in a particular context and by specific actor that in the end, 
provides various meanings. In this regard, the concept of national identity in this thesis is 
being simplified into a felicitous combination of the following elements as prerequisites: 
(1) political system, as an embodiment of common understanding towards certain rights 
and/or duties of the members; (2) national culture, as a measure of common roots based 
on a set of crystallised aspirations, sentiments and ideas (Smith, 1991); and (3) 
international status, which defines a nation’s role in the world, its worldview in order to 
harness its relations with other countries based on its national interest and also facilitates 
its way in negotiating differences with others that are opposed to its interest (Dittmer, 
2010) which inarguably concerns the pursuit of security and economic interest at a larger 
scope. 
In order to understand national identity in a more rigid way, the concept of foreign 
policy helps to provide a concrete embodiment of national identity. The notion of national 
identity as a source of foreign policy could be tracked to the idea coined by Charles De 
Gaulle3; foreign policy is very much influenced by how national identity is perceived, that 
a country’s characters determine what it seeks to protect and pursue (Jones S. , 
2003). National identity provides legitimation for the government to exercise its foreign 
policy under the justification that it represents the ‘national community’ in dealing with 
                                                      
3 de Gaulle's definition of foreign policy: 'a certain idea of France ... and that France could not be herself without 
greatness. 
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external parties (Walace, 1991). Both concepts are interrelated in a way that national 
identity serves as backgrounder for foreign policy and foreign policy plays the roles as a 
tool for nation-building – in earlier era, while now its usage is more flexible and broader 
in scope (Bloom, 1990). Hence, foreign policy directly or indirectly reflects a country’s 
national identity, as ideological elements in foreign policy such as democracy and human 
rights values, become more prominent since they are employed to determine what kind 
of foreign policy produced by a state. In short, foreign policy serves a country’s national 
interest in which national identity is prominent.   
 
b. Regional Identity 
How a region is pictured or explained should never be taken for granted as region, 
in nature, is a social and political construction in which a region’s identity is then created. 
As Acharya, a prominent regionalist academic noted, regions are just like nation-states; 
they are imagined in a sense that they are socially constructed rather than just based on 
geographical lines. The success or failure in developing a region’s identity then, indicates 
how the countries’ involved therein cooperate or in conflict with each other (Acharya & 
Layug, 2012).  
Similar but slightly more complex than national identity, the conceptualisation of 
regional identity could be understood through the distinction between the identity of a 
specific territory or region, and the collective identity of the inhabitants (regional 
consciousness) (Paasi, 2011). The former, or region’s identity, points to narratives, 
symbols and practices that are associated with a specific territory such as its geographical 
landscape or demographics (Paasi, 2011), for example how certain narrative of a region 
is disseminated through school curricula. It is then created in a manner that serves an 
ideal image of a community. The latter, or social consciousness, refers to a more factual 
signifier that may manifest themselves in the form of social values to create an ‘ideal’ 
identity through discourses like social class, gender, ethnic or religion (Paasi, 2011).    
c. Regionalism 
This thesis sees that the realisation, or institutionalisation of regional identity, is 
better understood under the concept of regionalism. Based on the understanding that 
sees regionalism as a response to globalisation that presents opportunities for advancing 
countries’ development notwithstanding the possibility to solicit both positive and negative 
outcomes (Farrell, Hettre, & Van Langenhove, 2005), regionalism is a strategy utilised by 
states to preserve its interest in responding to external pressures or agendas through 
gaining social standing in a rather leaner scope. It should not be neglected that economic 
and political agendas are often prioritised by actors in advancing regionalism, however 
identity and self-perception also plays a crucial role in forming regionalism (Farrell, Hettre, 
& Van Langenhove, 2005). 
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For individual state, regionalism provides an opportunity particularly for smaller 
states in getting a privilege to channel their interests in regional table; it gives them seat 
and voice during negotiation and as a result, the regional mechanism produced influences 
developments and creation of norms among the members as they become more advance 
over time (Katzenstein, 2005). In this regard, regionalism is seen as an outcome or result 
of the interaction process between national and regional identities; regionalism provides 
the basis for a region to produce a common view or position towards certain matter 
concerning the interest of the region, and regionalism is also the result of such interaction. 
In this research, the analysis of regionalism is expected to highlight the opposition or 
alignment between national and regional identities operating under certain norms and 
rules based on the sense of regional entitlement. 
d. National identity vis-à-vis regional identity and regionalism 
Upon establishing the concepts of national identity, regional identity and 
regionalism, the next step is to understand how national identity could affect regional 
identity and subsequently, regionalism. To understand this, it is important to not disregard 
the very basic premises of how a region is constructed and operationalised: region is not 
an independent actor on its own and it is dependent on the interaction among the actors 
and stakeholders involved. As Acharya noted: ”…Just as the nation-state cannot be viable 
without a sense of nationalism, region too cannot be region without a sense of 
regionalism” (Acharya & Layug, 2012). The interactions between countries inside the 
scope of a region should be looked not only at what is common between and among 
them, but also how the members, especially the elites, project or imagine themselves as 
part of a region (Acharya & Layug, 2012) (Paasi, 2011). To this end, regional identity 
should be seen as an evolving phenomenon and on-going process as well as a desirable 
outcome. These internal consolidation efforts towards identity are the key in shaping how 
a region is formed; how actors, mostly elites, and other prominent stakeholders develop 
a sense of regional consciousness in shaping the discourse of the region.  
The operationalisation of the three abovementioned concepts could be simplified 
into the following: 
Input           Output 
 
Thus, regionalism represents a collective form the members’ interests, capacities 
and identities as they are realised within regional context and expressed through 
interaction with other actors (Acharya & Layug, 2012) that derives from members’ 
 National Identity Regional Identity 
Regionalism 
(common position) 
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interaction and interpretation towards what the region is. There would be no regional 
identity of a region without any projection by its members on what constitute a region is, 
and this projection is very much depends on how the members look at (1) their own 
identities; (2) similarities, differences or other identifying factors between them.; and (3) 
what constitute as the “others”. What a region is and how it operates very much depend 
on and links to the self-identification of those who possess the authority to create and 
extend their interpretation to societies at large. 
e. Chairmanship conduct/modalities 
Given the above explanation, we now take all concepts to see how national 
identity, illustrated through a chairmanship, being operated in a regional context. The 
modalities of a running organisation, most of the time, depend on the command of the 
chairmanship, in which a chair performs its function under what is stipulates under the 
formal agreement by an organisation. Nevertheless, it is fair to understand that a chair, 
as a country, may have its own preference in conducting its capacity as chair in which as 
a result it often invests its national interest through prioritising certain agenda and specific 
goal with a view to achieving a ‘return of investment’. 
In this regard, there are three institutional dimensions of the chairmanship that 
could be seen as safeguarding principles in organisational attributes. According to a study 
based on the case taken from the operationalisation of the UN chairmanship, the following 
three aspects would help to maintain the neutrality and professionality that should be 
undertaken by the chair (Blauvokous & Bourantonis, 2011): 
1. Mandates: serves as the basic foundation for the chair in determining its capacity 
over the negotiation process which will lead to a certain outcome. This includes 
the power and control entails in the position of a chair over a negotiation process 
including as drafting of meeting’s agenda, issuing official public statements on 
behalf of the members and concluding final rapporteur task; 
2. Legitimacy/resources: the chair will utilise information, access and political capital 
with a view to capitalising its performance, which is supported not only by chair’s 
authority but also political support extended by the members. Hence, legitimacy 
refers to the approval and support by parties involved in the negotiation based on 
the chair’s political influence over groups that are inside and outside a particular 
negotiation; and 
3. Formal/informal constraints: organisational setup and the nature of the 
organisation that limits/restrains the chair’s capacity and control, e.g. decision-
making procedure, norms and principle adopted by the organisation. 
Empirical case is taken from the British presidency of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) 1992 in which the British had to deal with the issue of the role of the 
UNSC in post-cold war era, formally, while informally the forum sought to discuss the 
status of Russia in the UNSC (Blauvokous & Bourantonis, 2011). There are three 
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highlighted important achievements throughout this presidency: (1) convening a summit 
level which displayed an institutional novelty by conducting the highest-level meeting; (2) 
shaping the UN substantive political agenda on SC reform, and (3) acted in agreement 
with the other permanent UNSC members to opress any opposition. As a result, the 
combined political power and influence of the British’s political capital ensured that 
reactions remained under control and goes under the desired direction (Blauvokous & 
Bourantonis, 2011). The following table depicts how the British operated the institutional 
dimensions of its UNSC presidency: 
Institutional dimension Chair’s action 
Mandate: tasks and intervention Narrow and concrete: issuance of formal 
statement and innovation in procedure 
through calling for extraordinary meeting 
Resource: information, political capital 
creating legitimacy 
Private consultation with other 
permanent UNSC members, shaping 
meeting’s agenda 
Constraint: decision-making, other 
mechanisms 
Consensus, veto power, no chair re-
appointment due to rotational format 
This case provides an illustration that even though the functional mechanism for 
agenda management, backstage diplomacy and representation are rigid in nature, it could 
shift contextually, based on the powers and responsibilities delegated to and exercised 
by to formal leadership of the chair. These processes led to members’ support to the chair 
and the outcome produced by the negotiation. 
To this end, this thesis holds the view that the conduct of chairmanship rests on 
both rational choice and sociological dimensions. In principle, the underlying three 
factors affecting the conduct of chairmanship operate under the logics of the said two 
complementary approaches: first, the politics in leadership are fluid and very much 
affected by appropriation in a sense that actors are driven by the wish to do the right thing 
in a certain institutional context that are formal, shaped by identities, expectations, norms 
and roles as they define what constitutes appropriate behaviour (Tallberg, 2006), however 
leadership and authority also rest on trust, legitimacy and social acceptance. This brings 
to the second point, that is a chair could exercise its influence not only when they have 
legitimacy, but also when they receive resources in terms of informational and procedural 
that could help to persuade parties involved to a certain objective or outcome. The third 
one is the constraints that derive on both formal rules of the institution and informal norms 
of appropriate behaviour. 
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       Chairmanship            Rational/Sociological 
         Dimension  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Later on, the thesis will prove that the operationalisation of chairmanship is a form 
of regional identity making. Given that a region is a social construct, in this context 
chairmanship is an attempt to construct and realise a regional identity through the 
development of long-term habit of consultations, as noted by Acharya with reference to 
Asia-Pacific multilateralism (Acharya, 1997) as particularly for Asia, producing and 
maintaining process and interactions of members in the region is deemed as more 
essential than the realisation of the end objective itself (Acharya, 1997). 
 
I.3.3 Conceptual operationalisation 
To sum up, this thesis will analyse and operationalise: 
1. How Myanmar, Malaysia and Lao PDR project their national identities under the 
auspices of ASEAN regional identity; 
2. The ways and means the three countries undertake their policies during respective 
chairmanships, which affected the outcome of negotiations; 
3. How the outcomes of negotiations reflect the interests contained therein: individual 
countries’ or ASEAN’s; and 
Rules determined by institution, or 
norms on cost-benefit basis? 
Authority by institution or gaining 
legitimacy by support? 
Efficient, based on given task, or 
inefficient, appropriating 
conditions? 
Mandate
Formal 
task/institutional
Appropriateness
Resources/
authority
Formal power
Legitimacy/social 
acceptance
Constraints
Formal rules
Informal norms
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4. Conclude the underlying pattern throughout 2014 to 2016 to see how national 
identities of Myanmar, Malaysia and Lao PDR affect ASEAN’s common position 
on the issue of South China Sea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome: Regionalism 
 
 
ASEAN’s position on 
South China Sea 
Regional identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandate, resource, 
constraints: 
rational/sociological? 
 
National identity 
Political 
system 
National 
culture 
International 
position 
Myanmar 
Malaysia 
Lao PDR 
ASEAN 
Chairmanship 
Conclusion: do 
national identities 
matter? 
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CHAPTER II 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
II. 1 ASEAN and Southeast Asia’s regional identity 
 
II.1.1 National identities of Myanmar, Malaysia and Lao PDR 
In order to understand what constitutes national identities of Myanmar, 
Malaysia and Lao PDR, this thesis employs three features viz. political system, 
national culture (including official languages, religions, ethnic groups, historical 
experiences) and international status/view (including foreign policy). While this is 
arguably a simplification of what national identity is, the three indicators help providing 
general understanding of the complex and contextual nature of national identities for 
the three countries. Further, they also summarised features affecting the course of a 
country’s security and economic trajectory.  
A detailed matrix of the three countries’ national identities appeared in 
APPENDIX 1 (with reference to China). In summary, provided with the histories they 
experienced and the practices they exercise presently, the three countries project 
stark differences in their identities and conduct. Myanmar endured a long history of 
divided identities that is also embedded in its constitutional structure directed to 
exclude those categorized as “beyond the pale“ (Myanmarisation) (Dittmer, 2010); 
making Burmese culture, language and Buddhism become hegemonic, thus religion 
has been commonly used as a common denominator for any political issue in the 
country. Hence for Myanmar, its perpetual challenge is managing its geographically 
fractured and ethnically diverse border areas, for example the Rakhine state. For 
Malaysia, cultural hegemony is a well-fitting ‘title’ for the country as the country’s 
persistence into a Malay political hegemony (Nelson, Meerman, & Embong, 2008) by 
claiming indigeneity of the Malays has been a way taken by granted by its society at 
this point, given that the country is among the most multi-races in Southeast Asia. 
While cultural leadership and policies remain divided, many hold to the vision of a 
Malay core identity in their perception about the country. Lao PDR as a nation-state 
has been alleged to owing more to its powerful colonialist and neighbours (the French 
Indochina as well as Thailand) rather than its own self-determination (Fox, 1982). 
However, the mix of traditional politics, accompanied by entrenched communist-style 
patron-client relations has produced a distinct, eclectic political culture of Lao PDR. 
Given the hefty past of colonialism, the notion of national identity in Southeast 
Asia is mostly a top-down construction by the government taking into account how 
prominent it was for nation-building efforts. Thus, governments plays the role in 
providing ‘narratives of justification’ (Müller, 2015) over what constitutes states’ 
identities. Important to note is the legacy of colonialism and the nationalism reaction 
and awakening it has subsequently produced in almost all Southeast Asian countries 
that in the end, crated the wave of nation-building efforts e.g. how anti-colonial 
nationalism consequently turned into a nationalism of inter-ethnic disputes and 
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conflicts as happened in Myanmar’s Rakhine. This, in turn, resulted in a behaviour 
where most Southeast Asian states particularise their governance through explicit or 
implicit preferences towards certain ethnic group or discrimination based on 
categories, race being the most common, in governance and many other public 
sectors. This thesis subsequently is of the view that this practice is what makes the 
concept of national identity so prominent in Southeast Asian states. National identity 
is the basis of a country’s view and stance in international setting. It is a signifier that 
function to define what makes a country as a different entity from the other. 
 
II.1.2 ASEAN: Southeast Asia’s Regionalism 
With the vast diversity of Southeast Asia, ASEAN regionalism then provides a 
narrative of one Southeast Asia, representing an “imagined community” (Acharya, 
2012). From the outset, ASEAN Leaders recognised the importance of regional 
identity-building during its establishment through 1967 Bangkok Declaration as the 
grouping assured the need to preserve their national identities should go hand in hand 
with the development of a regional existence – hence the importance of sovereignty 
perseverance. Up to 50 years of its establishment, the organisation has developed 
into a much more institutionalised entity, addressing not merely political-security 
concerns, but also complex economic and social issues with the goal of improving the 
lives of its peoples (ASEAN Community4). The following matrix provides a summary 
of ASEAN’s bread-and-butter in its day-to-day operation: 
Underlying principles Structure/governing body 
ASEAN Charter: rules-based 
organisation 
ASEAN Summit; annual rotation of 
chairmanship based on alphabetical order 
Non-interference, sovereignty  Three pillars: ASEAN Political-Security 
Community, ASEAN Economic Community, 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
Decision making: consultation and 
consensus 
Over 800 Organs convene over 1,200 
meetings annually 
Settlement of disputes by peaceful 
means, renunciation of the threat of 
use of force 
Supporting function: ASEAN Secretary-
General and Secretariat 
                                                      
4 ASEAN Community 2015 laid out the strong political affirmation by ASEAN to be integrated as one community 
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What constitutes ASEAN’s regional identity, then, is its very own principles 
which provides the modalities on how member states interact with each other. Being 
in ASEAN means being able to put a country’s national identity in a regional framework 
which operates based on sovereignty protection, non-interference, consultation and 
consensus; to this end, ASEAN forms its very own contrived regional identity, 
providing a social standing for its members. 
Hence, regional identity building in ASEAN is in line with what Acharya noted 
as a character of multilateral institution-building in the Asia-Pacific, that multilateralism 
renders as a process of an identity building with strong emphasis on processes and 
aspects dwelling on social and intrapersonal values, rather than a legal and formal 
dimension of the institution (Acharya, 1997). Through its attempt to construct a 
regional identity cultivated by the development of long-term habit of consultations, the 
unity of ASEAN is not only projected internally among its members, but also outwardly 
with the claim of ASEAN centrality in which ASEAN sees itself as the driving force in 
the regional architecture that includes major powers. As Caballero-Anthony, an 
erstwhile director at the ASEAN Secretariat handling external relations defines what 
ASEAN centrality is, the centrality of ASEAN is particularly unique as not only it locates 
itself in the middle of relevant powers, it creates linkages, connects and bridges them 
by positioning itself in the driver seat, thus “ASEAN’s structural position in the dense 
web of networks…. explain why ASEAN is seen as the driver of and a fulcrum for other 
regional institutions in Asia” (Caballero-Anthony, 2014). In this regard, ASEAN’s 
regionalism serves as a double-edged sword; it keeps the region together while it 
provides a space for flexibility. Issues and concerns could be contained and managed 
in a way that suited status quo interests, geographically and institutionally.  
 
 
II.1.3 The diverging interpretation of and the use of ASEAN 
 
 In a nutshell, it could be assumed that while regionalism is a result of ASEAN’s 
consultation and consensus of what constitutes regional identity, each ASEAN 
member state then has different perception and meaning of what ASEAN is for them 
in which national identity being a determinant factor. In this regard, it is important to 
see what each chair make of ASEAN before analysing the conduct of their respective 
chairmanships.  
 
a. Myanmar 
Myanmar’s move in joining ASEAN signalled a foreign policy attributing towards 
multilateralism trend with a view to providing the country with capability to respond to 
outside pressures, particularly from its dialogue partners – the US, the EU and the UN, 
given its complex domestic issues especially on human rights (Dittmer, 2010). The 
move to join a regional alliance could be translated as means to gain political 
legitimacy and prestige in international stage given how self-contained the country was 
particularly. Khin Nyut, Myanmar’s then prime minister in 2003, initiated Myanmar’s 
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membership to ASEAN recognising the country was not in the best position on 
international relations front (Steinberg, 2010). As the military rule tended to limit any 
moves akin to liberalisation in the country, ASEAN’s campaign on neutrality was seen 
as the best approach for Myanmar as it is presented with the opportunity to contain 
itself from outside pressure and be provided with room to manage issues bilaterally 
with particular countries that are opposed to its interests (Dittmer, 2010). ASEAN’s 
non-interference, non-intervention informal style of diplomacy makes it all the more 
beneficial for Myanmar as it gains unspoken support for its domestic issue remain left 
“untouched” and to be resolved outside the multilateral fora.  
 
b. Malaysia 
Malaysia’s foreign policy, in nature, demonstrates “middle power trait” that 
designs the move engineered to enable the country to maintain beneficial ties with 
China while at the same time preserve its free and independent foreign policy, which 
heightens its positionality within ASEAN, that sometimes be regarded as a leadership 
position towards developing countries (Gilley & O'Neil, 2014). The middle power trait 
or statecraft/middlepowermanship is a trait concerning forms, strategies and actions 
of countries that are medium in political-economic power and utilise their foreign policy 
moves as a bridge between major powers (Saravanamuttu, 2010). ASEAN, since the 
beginning, has been an important instrument for and the cornerstone of Malaysian 
foreign policy even though at that time, the notion of “ASEAN centrality in regional and 
global architecture” was not very well-known and strongly promoted yet. The 
establishment of an ASEAN Community was wholeheartedly pushed by Malaysia 
along with the signing of ASEAN Charter in late 2007. It is important to see ASEAN as 
a crucial instrument of Malaysia’s attempts in handling issues regionally and globally 
(Saravanamuttu, 2010) as it is well embedded in its foreign policy. 
 
c. Lao PDR 
The mention of ASEAN in various literatures about Lao PDR is surprisingly rare 
and limited to economic context and macroeconomic development concerning, among 
others, regional economic integration, trade liberalisation (Bourdet, 2000); 
(Leebouapao, 2014); (Howe & Park, 2015) as well as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam (CLMV) cooperation under ASEAN’s framework such as the Initiative for an 
ASEAN Integration and Narrowing Development Gap (IAINDG). Tracing back to its 
early days of membership in ASEAN, Lao PDR lacked any strength and national drive 
to commit enough to the regional organisation as it was suggested that the main 
reason Lao PDR decided to join ASEAN was driven by Viet Nam’s joining ASEAN 
while the country itself was not particularly strong in its will to do so (Stuart‐Fox, 1998). 
The move by Viet Nam was imitated by Lao PDR with regard to using ASEAN as a 
catalyst in its international position particularly vis-à-vis China, as well as in respect to 
the demands by other international organisations such as the Asian Development 
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Bank and aid donors with regard to the promotion of a more integrated Southeast Asia 
(Stuart‐Fox, 1998).  
 
II.2 Locating ASEAN in South China Sea 
 
II.2.1 ASEAN’s position through its political documents  
This thesis will focus particularly on how ASEAN’s position regarding the South 
China Sea is reflected on (1) the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) 
Joint Communique (JC) as a negotiated document led by the chair, usually issued in 
July and (2) the Chairman’s Statement (CS) which reflected the Leaders’ view (head 
of states/government level) that is under the chair’s prerogative rights, issued twice as 
the outcome of ASEAN Summit every year normally in April/May and November. This 
is notwithstanding other crucial documents issued by ASEAN at ministerial and leader 
levels e.g. ASEAN-China Dialogue Partnership, however it should be noted that such 
documents are the result of both ASEAN-China’s negotiations hence they do not 
reflect an untainted ASEAN’s view. 
Under the Bangkok Declaration 1967 and until the first ASEAN Summit was 
held, the AMM had functioned as the highest de facto decision-making body in ASEAN 
machinery. Upon the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, the highest decision-
making body is then assumed by the ASEAN Summit. The AMM is mandated to 
address all matters pertaining to political and security cooperation (except non-
traditional security) in ASEAN as well as ASEAN’s external relations. Starting 2001, 
the ASEAN Summit meets regularly on an annual basis. The Charter prescribes for 
the ASEAN Summit Meetings to be held twice annually.  The ASEAN Summit also can 
be convened, whenever necessary, as special or ad hoc meetings to be chaired by 
the Member State holding the ASEAN chairmanship (paragraphs 3 (a) and (b), Article 
7 of the Charter. The first Summit of the year involving the ten ASEAN Leaders is 
meant to discuss regional integration issues, and is normally held in the months of 
April or May each year. The second Summit which involves leaders of ASEAN’s 
Dialogue Partners and the UN is normally held in October or November each year.5 
As it becomes stronger in its voice promoting a full integration, or a Community, 
ASEAN’s outcome documents have become a valuable instrument and opportunity to 
reflect its voice for international actors to understand the latest development in the 
region. In this regard, a political statement through annual outcome documents reflects 
the organisation’s common view and accommodates its members’ independent views, 
if any, in a manner that should not overlap regional’s stance. It is not merely an overly 
long declaration on all issues discussed; for ASEAN, the ability to secure/issue a 
statement, declaration or agreement is an achievement by itself. There is always a 
                                                      
5 See ASEAN Charter: http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf  
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hidden intention and meaning behind removal, or insertion of particular language, 
usage of certain phrases, both in documents that are the pre-written and negotiated. 
 
II.2.2 Inconsistency of ASEAN’s position on South China Sea 
In APPENDIX II, a detailed accentuations, emphasis and language concerning 
the South China Sea as reflected in the annual CS and JC issued during the 
chairmanships of Myanmar, Malaysia and Lao PDR is showcased with a view to 
understanding how the documents share strong similarity but furnished with different 
nuances. In general, ASEAN maintains its somewhat neutral position by constantly 
retaining its commitment on the principles of international law, including the 1982 
UNCLOS, without resorting to threat or force, as well as ASEAN’s concern which 
remains with regional stability, peace and freedom of navigation and over-flights. 
However, the following analysis shows how inconsistencies could still be found 
throughout the documents: 
 
a. Myanmar 
The degree of concerns over situation in South China Sea throughout 2014 was 
expressed through the term “serious concerns”. It is observable that the two CSs and 
JC consistently put “full and effective implementation of DOC in its entirety”, however 
it is worthy to note that the term “an early conclusion of the COC” in the first CS was 
elevated into “the early conclusion of the COC” on the JC and November’s CS. The 
latter documents were also enriched with the inclusion of reference to other guiding 
documents including ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea, the urge 
to intensify consultation with China, importance of the collective commitments of 
ASEAN Member State and early harvest measures. Under the negotiated JC, the 
paper on the Triple Action Plan introduced by the Philippines and other proposals on 
Article 5 of the DOC raised by other ASEAN Foreign Ministers (FM) on the South 
China Sea was put under notation – which means that they were neither approved or 
denied, but simply noted. 
The standalone FM statement resonated the same concern and use the term 
“an early conclusion” instead of “the early conclusion”. It is also important to note that 
under the Nay Pyi Taw Declaration on Realisation of the ASEAN Community; that is 
a special statement in light of the establishment of ASEAN community in 2015 and not 
part of annual outcome documents; a substantive paragraph on South China Sea was 
also included which touched upon DOC implementation, 1982 UNCLOS, COC 
conclusion as well as ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles while the Nay Pyi Taw Declaration 
itself focus on the establishment of ASEAN Community which is more perpetual in 
nature. This shows the degree of prominence ASEAN gave to South China Sea issue 
as well as naturalisation of the issue as ASEAN’s perpetual agenda. 
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b. Malaysia 
The dynamics reflected in the outcome documents under Malaysia’s 
chairmanship is interesting; the first CS retained the expression of serious concern 
and included the instruction to FM in addressing this matter constructively utilising the 
principle of peaceful co-existence. It should be noted that the said principle is among 
the core foreign policy adopted by China. Further, the statement used the language of 
establishment of an effective COC, which brought a different notion compared to 
“an/the conclusion”. 
The negotiated JC, on the other hand, added the expression of “serious 
concerns expressed by some Ministers…” which shows the diverging views occurred 
by ASEAN states, as not all ministers shared the same view. Again, the COC was also 
mentioned under the notion of “establishment”. However, it recognised a proposal by 
Indonesia on practical cooperation as well as Philippines’ briefing on matters relating 
to 1982 UNCLOS which referred to the PCA tribunal. The second CS echoed the 
language reflected in the JC without any addition. It should be noted that the three 
documents included the full and effective implementation of the DOC, and there was 
no additional document issued during Malaysia’s chairmanship. However, it should be 
taken into account that in 205 Malaysia spearheaded the establishment of ASEAN 
Community and many outcome documents on various issues were adopted. 
 
c. Lao PDR 
The stark observation on the outcome documents of 2016 was the omission of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal6 in all documents.7 There was no 
new phrasing or important language observable other than the usage of early adoption 
of an effective COC in both documents, which is a strong language as it is.8 The 
standalone FM statement sponsored by Indonesia9 on the Maintenance of Peace, 
Security, and Stability in the Region did not mention South China Sea directly and 
simply expressed affirmation towards ASEAN’s common position in the Joint 
Communiqué of the 49th AMM. The next section under this chapter titled Lao PDR’s 
ASEAN Chairmanship will show how the JC tried to incorporated reference to 
international law (legal and diplomatic processes) in the most guileful approach. 
 
d. Negotiated document vs non-negotiated document 
While joint communique tends to incorporate the diverging views by 
incorporating notation towards certain proposal made by certain members, chairman’s 
statement tend to repeat the agreed language from previous adopted documents. 
Though there is no clear-cut understanding on the degree of strength attributed to the 
                                                      
6 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea Arbitration initiated by the Philippines under Annex VII of UNCLOS 1982 
against China 
7 There was only one CS during Lao PDR as the 28th and 29th Summits were held back-to-back in August 2016 
8 According to the Dictionary of Diplomacy, adoption means the formal act by which a treaty is agreed by the 
state involved in a negotiation or by the international organization within which the negotiation has taken place. 
9 See http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/08/12/indonesia-stresses-peace-and-stability-in-south-
china-sea-after-vietnam-fortifies-spratly-islands.html  
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words adoption, conclusion or establishment with reference to the COC10, it is worth 
questioning why these words are used interchangeably while the object and purpose 
is clearly, supposed to be, the same. Further, such diversion of formulation is a 
departure from ASEAN practice to create documents from pre-written language.  
This thesis, hence, has used discourse analysis to scrutinize ASEAN’s political 
statements which shaped the discourse of South China Sea issue under the auspices 
of ASEAN. It is clear that ASEAN always maintains the lowest common denominator 
in stating its position through “maintaining peace and stability, maritime security, 
freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea”, emphasis on 
DOC and aspiration towards a COC as well as recognition of principles of international 
law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. On the other hand, it carefully navigates the 
positioning of China through direct or non-direct referencing of South China Sea or 
China itself, as well as ongoing events/tension on the ground. ASEAN, in this regard, 
constructs a notion of the ideal, or what should be happening, utilising the actual 
conflict on the South China Sea discourse. 
 
II.3 Managing ASEAN’s position in South China Sea 
ASEAN’s position on South China Sea, as reflected in the above section, is a 
result of multilateral negotiations, however tenuous, with the chair being a constituent 
component of the structure, not a third party. The three countries as chair held the 
same mandate that took place in a constrained environment with regard to decision-
making process, with consultation, consensus and unanimity being the rule. 
Underlying this process is the principle of non-interference which has been rooted in 
and religiously operated by ASEAN. Nevertheless, the three countries exhibit different 
levels of engagement in the bargaining process with different stakes. 
 
II.3.1 Myanmar’s ASEAN Chairmanship 
Myanmar’s assumption of chairmanship took its toll at a rather important 
juncture, which was amidst heightened expectations for both Myanmar (upon the 2011 
domestic reforms) and ASEAN (towards the accomplishment of an integrated 
region/ASEAN Community by 2015). Having been an ASEAN member since 1997, 
2014 was the first time ever for the then-military ruling country to lead the organisation 
even though it has had the opportunity to chair high-level ASEAN meetings and not a 
camaraderie to ASEAN regional agenda. Nevertheless with taking up the role as a 
formal chair of all ASEAN high profile meetings, the year 204 then required the country 
to take the lead in a whole different height both nationally and regionally, including 
setting the country’s reputation straight with international stakeholders who are not 
familiar with the country, managing agenda and initiatives throughout the year as well 
as promoting and maintaining ASEAN’s relations with its external partners that are 
                                                      
10 Personal communication, 29 November 2017 
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crucial for the maintenance of its regional cooperation (Thuzar, 2013). However, 
Myanmar’s rather infantry in ASEAN benefited the country to engage itself wholefully 
in ASEAN community-building agenda and subsequently, be provided with relevant 
training to improve its capacities and capabilities in undertaking a new role as a chair 
(Chongkittavorn, 2014). ASEAN members as well as ASEAN Secretariat also 
rendered their technical supports to help the country meet the requirement for 
chairmanship.11 To this end, the country’s chairmanship was expected to take the 
country’s stance, bilaterally and multilaterally, to a more constructive level, both with 
regard to the implementation of its domestic changes and participation in ASEAN 
agenda.  
Nevertheless, the rising tensions in the South China Sea occurred in early 2014 
presented a real challenge for the new chair as it was put in a conflicting position that 
was to maintain a balance between safeguarding ASEAN solidarity and managing its 
bilateral relationship with China.12 For the seriousness and urgency of the then-
ongoing incident on the South China Sea as China placed an oil-rig well inside Viet 
Nam’s territory, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers adopted a standalone statement prior 
to the issuance of annual Joint Communique which later resonated the same 
expression. Overall, they expressed serious concern over the developments in the 
disputed waters, and called for all parties to exercise self-constraint and an early 
conclusion of the COC. However, it should be noted that the statement neither 
mentioned China nor specific incidents between Viet Nam and China. While the 
statement did not carry any message with “name and shame” towards any party, 
Myanmar elevated the significance of the South China Sea by creating a standalone 
document and subsequently, the chair was able to form a move for a clearer ASEAN 
voice vis-à-vis China on the South China Sea in a very subtle way. Compared with the 
joint statement by the ministers, the Nay Pyi Taw Declaration, which was issued in the 
light of forthcoming ASEAN Community 2015, did not even mention the recent 
tensions in the South China Sea. Although Viet Nam and the Philippines have acted 
more aggressively in their attitudes against China on the ground (Sun, 2014), all 
documents avoided picking a side. 
Myanmar, ASEAN and China 
The economic relations of Myanmar and China is apparent in which there is a 
dependency pattern crafted; Myanmar needs China’s aid and investment to bolster its 
economy and modernization and it is clear that Myanmar still renders China as an 
important patron in its foreign policy (Shihong, 2014). China then had sought 
Myanmar’s support of China’s position on the South China Sea in ASEAN forums, 
which was not agreed by Myanmar with a view to safeguarding the principle of 
neutrality (Sun, 2014). While many worried that the South China Sea issue would be 
                                                      
11 In 2005, Myanmar was forced to forgo the 2006 chairmanship of ASEAN due to external pressures mostly from 
western countries campaigning for human rights as well as some member states that adopt the same view 
(Burma will not take Asean chair, 2005) 
12 The Irrawaddy’s interview with Aung Htoo, Deputy Director-General at Myanmar’s ASEAN Department (Mon, 
2014) 
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the biggest challenge for Myanmar as ASEAN chair exactly because of this reason, 
Myanmar was of the view that its close ties with China would be an advantage instead 
in dealing with the South China Sea issue.13 The decline of its relations with China 
which was also influenced by Myanmar’s domestic reform created an even more 
sensitive situation between both – any major initiative by Myanmar that could risk 
China under the spotlight or escalate bigger attention towards the South China Sea 
issue would put Myanmar as the opposition of China (Sun, 2014).  
To this end, Myanmar then maintained a neutral stance and chose to avoid any 
move that could create any escalation; it understood that China remains an important 
stakeholder geopolitically and geoeconomically while it also had to protect ASEAN 
solidarity (Shihong, 2014). Understanding its importance, analysts from Myanmar’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated Myanmar’s stance: “… A fallout like the one created 
by Cambodia in 2012 was simply out of question [so] Myanmar will not sweep the 
issue of South China Sea under the carpet” (Sun, 2014). As such, the issuance of the 
standalone ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Current Developments in the 
South China Sea on 10 May 2014, which is the first of its kind since the ASEAN 
Declaration on the South China Sea adopted at the 25th AMM in 1992,14 reflects great 
commitment by Myanmar as the chair. Myanmar managed to provide a special avenue 
for claimant states through a dedicated ASEAN statement that addressed the South 
China Sea disputes while not stating any direct references to China (Tan & Korovin, 
2015); (Shihong, 2014).  
Overall policy 
Myanmar tried hard to prove itself as a capable chair, which invoked its strong 
sense of ASEAN regional identity, through situating itself within ASEAN and China by 
accommodating both interests. It reflects that neutrality is different from staying silent. 
It is also makes sense for Myanmar to be neutral on this issue given that it is not a 
claimant state, hence it is not the country’s fight to begin with. However, as a member 
and chair of ASEAN, the need to prioritise ASEAN solidarity is pressing; between its 
obligations as ASEAN chair and its domestic relations with China, Myanmar in this 
regard had pursued modest goals on the South China Sea issue (maintaining status 
quo) hence skilfully navigated collective ASEAN’s position by full inclusion and 
discussion of the tensions in the South China Sea in ASEAN meetings but treated 
carefully in all outcome documents about name and shame at any parties, including 
China. 
In this regard, Myanmar’s mandate as the ASEAN chair is both set under formal 
boundaries set by the Charter’s constitution but also ‘forced’ to accommodate many 
interests and expectations given the juncture of the chairmanship hence, leading to 
certain degree of appropriateness.  Myanmar’s chairmanship for the first time since its 
accession to ASEAN 17 years ago itself is a historic moment in both Myanmar’s and 
ASEAN’s history. The timing of the chairmanship is even more momentous amidst the 
                                                      
13 President’s spokesman U Ye Htut (Sun, 2014) 
14 ASEAN Secretariat’s Post-Summit Briefing 2014 
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country’s on-going democratisation and reform process. This juncture provides both 
rational and sociological impact for Myanmar’s chairmanship: mounting expectations 
towards the chair rendered the country a formal power and hierarchy as provided by 
ASEAN’s institutional set-up as well as support towards legitimacy for the infant chair 
by other Member States. Myanmar’s long view of history and past rejection in taking 
up the role of chairmanship helps the country to know exactly how to place ASEAN as 
well as itself, in the regional and global scheme. Given these points, it is natural for 
Myanmar to perceive the importance carried upon by its role as ASEAN chair as a 
necessary step for the country’s re-launched and rebranding into the global stage and 
international community at large. 
 
II.3.2 Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship  
As the ASEAN chair in a crucial year for the Association, Malaysia was highly 
expected to manage two most pressing issues: South China Sea and ASEAN 
community-building. Following the standoff between China and Viet Nam in 2014, 
during 2015 the urgency on South China Sea was placed on enhancing efforts to 
ensure peace, stability and security in the South China Sea by complying to the DOC, 
intensifying consultations with China to expedite the conclusion of the COC, identifying 
commonalities between ASEAN and China as well as strengthening ASEAN’s 
leadership and centrality on the issue of South China Sea – inexplicitly explained 
under its chairmanship’s priorities towards peace and stability through moderation.15 
It should also be noted that 2015 was pledged to be the year for ASEAN to declare its 
establishment of one ASEAN Community, with the issuance of its commitment on 10-
year vision and blueprints.16 
Unlike Myanmar, Malaysia’s stake as the chair is much higher; any diplomatic 
calamity concerning the South China Sea would affect its standpoint as both the chair 
and a claimant state. The AMM Joint Communique in 2015 was named as the longest 
communique throughout 48 years of ASEAN establishment (Chongkittavorn, 2015), 
beckoning the complexities experienced by the drafting committee to finalise the text 
– no doubt, the South China Sea issue was the one took up most of the drafting 
process. The joint communique was released in a rather late manner, which also 
indicated the nature of discussions and complexities of issues discussed among 
ASEAN member states (Chongkittavorn, 2015). 
Malaysia, ASEAN and China 
As one of the claimant states and given its close relations with China, Malaysia 
arguably seemed to be the most suitable country to push more aggressively on South 
China Sea agenda including conclusion of the COC, particularly in its capacity leading 
                                                      
15 ASEAN Secretariat’s Post Summit Briefing 2015 
16 ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together was endorsed by ASEAN Leaders at their 27th Summit, which charts the 
path for ASEAN Community building over the next ten years.  
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ASEAN meetings and shaping the agenda consequently, as well as to urge China to 
exercise less assertive behaviour given previous incidents at sea. However, Malaysia 
was perceived as more likely to adopt a subtle approach in its regional diplomacy as 
the ASEAN chair which could be translated into preventive diplomacy measures.  
China and Malaysia have had a special relationship since 1974, 
notwithstanding their longstanding sovereignty dispute over certain features in the 
South China Sea. It was the first ASEAN member that normalised relations with China 
(Gilley & O'Neil, 2014) and it was the one that invited China to attend ASEAN forum 
for the first time ever. Since 2008, Malaysia has been China’s primary trading partner 
within ASEAN and up to 2014, China accounted for Malaysia’s 12% exports and 
16.9% imports and their trade accounted more than the US$100 billion mark 
(Malaysia’s Department of Statistics, 2014). High-level meetings between Chinese 
President Xi Jinping and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak took places a couple 
of time in which both pledged to enhance ties in all aspects. In 2010, Mahathir 
Mohamad, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia who left a lasting 
legacy/’personalised hegemony’ established the ‘Looking East’ approach, observed 
that “… China retains a political system that ensures stability, combined with a 
modified form of a “Western market” system” (Dosch, 2014) which makes Malaysia 
should maintain its good relations with China (Gilley & O'Neil, 2014). In the heyday of 
advancement of newly industrialised states and as Southeast Asian states orientating 
themselves around China given their economic motives (Van Klinken, 2014), Malaysia 
was also the one campaigning for regional economic integration (ASEAN Economic 
Community), making it a perpetual ASEAN agenda to present day. 
Taking into account its national interests and bilateral relations, Malaysia hence 
did not push hard on South China Sea as it remains a highly sensitive issue; instead, 
it focused more on advancing ASEAN community building towards ASEAN 
Community establishment as well as maintaining the notion of ASEAN centrality in the 
region. As observed in previous section, ASEAN’s statements in 2015 was not 
politically contentious and no specific statement concerning South China Sea was 
issued. As one of the founding members of ASEAN, Malaysia is well-aware of its 
special place in the organisation, its rather luminary’s over its fellows (see previous 
section about its middle power trait, natural leader). Notwithstanding Malaysia’s 
frequent emphasis that it would always be in line with ASEAN’s voice, Malaysia 
navigated its support in a way that avoids confrontation with China and instead, 
compromises on initiatives that accommodate practical cooperation and dialogue 
through other channels, e.g. the ASEAN defense forum. This way, Malaysia secured 
its relations with China without harming its status quo with ASEAN; which is logical, 
given the limited tenure of one-year chairmanship hence it would serve as a bad 
political move to press China on politically sensitive issues that could disrupt 
Malaysia’s relations with China in a longer term. Further, since China has thus far seen 
to be rather passive in its territorial dispute with Malaysia (Ho, Singh, & Teo, 2015), 
Malaysia has been known to prefer a “quiet diplomacy” rather than taking any 
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assertiveness towards China (Credo, 2015). To this end, Malaysia would rather 
manoeuvre its territorial claim on bilateral basis, just the way China prefers it. 
Although excluded from the focus of this thesis, it is important to note that 
Malaysia could not secure a joint declaration for the ASEAN Defense Ministers 
Meeting (ADMM) Plus in November 2015, a forum in which both China and the US 
are members. An ISEAS researcher focusing on ASEAN noted that the reason for 
such failure was the spat between China and the US in which the former refuse any 
name and shame while the latter insisted on mentioning the territorial dispute (Das, 
2015). Unlike ASEAN Summit and the AMM that are led/influenced by Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of ASEAN members, the ADMM is led by each ASEAN countries’ 
defense ministries which operated under different mechanisms and frameworks than 
the foreign affairs fronts.  
Overall policy 
Malaysia cleverly navigated its way in directing the tone of discussion over this 
sensitive issue, as well as the needed diplomatic manoeuvres to not mentioning any 
sensitive issues in all outcome documents under its chairmanship. Ideally, Malaysia 
would be an effective facilitator in concluding the COC with China, given its leverage 
from its close relations with China – however, Malaysia was strong on its preventive 
diplomacy or “low-profile” approach in addressing the maritime territorial disputes. It is 
wise to manage its disputes with China bilaterally than singling out this issue in 
regional forum without providing any feasible middle way; this created the result it 
expected which is to not disrupt beneficial relations with China as economic costs were 
entailed. 
However, this chairmanship highlighted two conflicting aspects: first, it 
reaffirmed ASEAN’s regional identity on the principles of consultation and consensus 
that are the core of how the organisation operates. Although South China Sea was 
high on 2015 agenda and some member states were pushy on their position towards 
South China Sea, maintaining ASEAN status quo at the lowest common denominator 
was still the result (amid the uncertainty whether Malaysia’s leadership was the main 
push). Secondly, it underlined the critical but impractical role played by the ASEAN 
chair. While Malaysia’s statesmanship in a way praised as brightly shining in 
navigating both parties’ status quo, it brought no significant advancement on ASEAN’s 
pressing issue right when the organisation claims its commitment to be a one 
integrated community. It seemed that Malaysia has been unwilling to take a further 
step in advancing ASEAN’s position, hence, there is no value-add of Malaysia being 
a chair that has more political-economic capacities compare to, say, Myanmar, if it 
could only preserve status quo. 
Malaysia’s chairmanship could be concluded to operationalise under effective 
mandate, formal power and formal rules. The foundations of Malaysian foreign policy 
and Malaysia’s confidence in its relationship with China suggest that Malaysia was not 
inclined to elevate the South China Sea as a priority during its ASEAN chairmanship. 
This chairmanship was strongly supported by the agenda of ASEAN Community 2015 
 28 
establishment, which helped Malaysia to manage its chairmanship under the bulwark 
of ASEAN community rather than the South China Sea. Malaysia is considered as a 
luminary to its fellow ASEAN colleagues and “natural” in its leadership style; how 
Malaysia has successfully able to manage to include specific issue or elements in the 
organisation’s agenda, and makes it something perpetual or natural, viz. the economic 
integration as early as 1997, was a concrete evident. Even when it did not contribute 
anything to South China Sea, member states still regarded the chairmanship as a 
successful one. 
 
II.3.3 Lao PDR’s ASEAN Chairmanship 
Lao PDR, as one of ASEAN late joiners, assumed the chairmanship role for the 
second time in a critical transition year for the regional grouping. 2016 regarded as an 
important year for ASEAN as it was transitioning to a fully integrated community upon 
the formation of an ASEAN Community in 2015 established in Malaysia, and preparing 
for the commemoration of the organisation’s 50th jubilee in 2017 under the Philippines. 
Furthermore, 2016 was an especially important year with the much-anticipated ruling 
from the issuance of the Arbitral Award on the South China Sea Arbitration initiated by 
the Philippines under Annex VII of UNCLOS 1982 against China.  
Throughout the priorities that Lao PDR outlined in 201617, it is clear what kind 
of urgencies that chair placed in its agenda, nationally and regionally, which is among 
the prerogatives and privileges as an ASEAN chair. Among others, Lao PDR 
underscored the finalisation of the work plan for the IAINDG for CLMV countries’ 
practical economic aid and cooperation so as to catch up with and diminish the gap 
between them and the ASEAN-6. Furthermore, the chairmanship offered Laos 
valuable additional benefits in addition to the honour of shaping ASEAN’s regional 
agenda throughout the year: being the only landlocked country in Southeast Asia, Lao 
PDR secured an international spotlight by being a formal leader of an organisation that 
altogether constitutes the world’s seventh largest economy, signalling the significance 
of both ASEAN and Lao PDR in a global stage; and presented with the opportunity to 
host high level meetings, with the then-US president Obama coming to visit the country 
for the first time (Parameswaran, 2016). The year 2016 was also crucial nationally; it 
was the year for the congress of ruling LPRP to stocktake the country’s political and 
economic performance over the past five years and adopted the next five-year plan 
accordingly (Sayalath & Creak, 2017). The said congress also elected the new Party 
Central Committee as the main decision-making body which approved nominations 
for the President and Prime Minister (Sayalath & Creak, 2017). It should be noted that 
in the following year, the then-Foreign Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, which is a regular 
face in ASEAN especially at the AMM, was elevated as the Prime Minister. All in all, 
there was no urgency placed with regard to maritime security or South China Sea 
during Lao PDR’s chairmanship. 
                                                      
17 See APPENDIX III 
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A tone of discouragement by public (media coverage and scholarly articles) is 
noted since ASEAN did not single out any reference the tribunal’s ruling in any of its 
outcome documents including July FM’s communique and September Leaders’ 
statement, and just repeating the old rhetorical terms of DOC, UNCLOS and COC (Ba, 
2017).  Following the ASEAN-US Special Leaders’ Summit held in February 2016 in 
Sunnylands, California, initiated by President Obama as his farewell to ASEAN 
Leaders resulted in the seventeen-point joint ASEAN-US statement or the Sunnylands 
declaration,18 the South China Sea PCA process was never cited directly but was 
referenced instead under the term of “legal and diplomatic processes” which was 
regarded as reference towards the PCA – this would be the practice adopted in the 
coming outcome documents under Lao PDR’s chairmanship. This Special Summit and 
the outcome was particularly important, bearing in mind that this was the first time 
ASEAN Leaders met after the official establishment of ASEAN Community by the end 
of 2015 and, funnily, did not took place in any ASEAN country. The 49th AMM Joint 
Communique has no mention on “legal and diplomatic processes” under South China 
Sea section, but putting the term under a generic section of ASEAN Community 
instead, without providing any context, that surely would give public a confusion in 
reading the statement. Furthermore, as ASEAN was unable to fall back to their agreed 
position in February 2016, assumption was placed that ASEAN had retreated from a 
firmer and more direct position they took prior to the issuance of the Arbitral Award. 
This particular development has once again presented a confusing question on 
ASEAN position and centrality. 
While not included as a focus in this thesis, an accidental incident on a 
retraction of press statement happened in June 2016 following a Special ASEAN–
China Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kunming, China19; it was observed that one of 
ASEAN countries “accidentally” (it was debated without any fixed conclusion whether 
it was an accidental or intentional move) posted an un-agreed statement on its 
website. The disputed issue was due to ASEAN’s decision to issue a press statement 
separately regarding South China Sea notwithstanding the other issues discussed by 
both parties while apparently within ASEAN itself, there was no agreed position to 
issue such statement (Parameswaran, 2016). This, undoubtedly, has led to the 
questioning of ASEAN centrality when it comes to addressing the South China Sea 
issue. 
 
Lao PDR, ASEAN and China 
China’s cultural imperialism towards Lao PDR has been deep-seated tracing 
back to the 14th century as the former’s influence over Lao PDR’s domestic institutions 
and structures has always been present. Economically, China has been the country’s 
                                                      
18 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/16/joint-statement-us-asean-special-
leaders-summit-sunnylands-declaration  
19 The mechanism of ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) as well as ad-hoc meeting such as the FM 
meeting is excluded from the focus of this thesis. 
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main partner in many fronts for ages, including trade, investment and aid  (Reeves, 
2016). As such, their economic relations are extended to China’s overarching power 
and influence over Lao PDR’s political structure, both in terms of national conduct and 
foreign relations (Reeves, 2016). Another important factor in both countries’ relations 
is ideological reason; that the act of Maoist national liberation movement was 
translated to the thinking that the Chinese Communist revolutionary should also be 
experienced by third world countries in order to undertake a change towards progress 
(Fox, 1982).  
China views Lao PDR as an important stakeholder with regard to its relations 
with ASEAN as geopolitically, Indochina has been China’s natural domain in extending 
its influence in Southeast Asia (Fox, 1982), making Lao PDR is too important to be 
ignored by China; it should be kept in mind that geographical proximity is an important 
feature of China’s rise itself. In the case of South China Sea, Lao PDR’s support to 
supress ASEAN’s assertiveness in its common voice on South China Sea is needed 
by China given that it has always been in China’s interest to deal with the issue 
bilaterally. Lao PDR seemed to have responded this in a manner that is largely in line 
with what Cambodia did during its capacity as ASEAN chair (Reeves, 2016) – this was 
in reference to Cambodia’s chairmanship in 2012 in which it refused to issue a joint 
communique that deemed as the country’s move to please China, first time ever in 
ASEAN’s history to fail in issuing an annual communique. 
From the lack of mention on what has been regarded as a real achievement on 
ASEAN’s side in a long time with regard to the South China Sea, it seemed that there 
remained divergent views among ASEAN members on the arbitral award in its formal 
documents which rendered it difficult to reach a common position on the issue. During 
the finalisation of the Joint Communique, some members called for strong languages 
reiterating ASEAN’s respect for at least, international laws and acknowledgement of a 
rules-based order, if the issue of South China Sea is regarded as too politically 
sensitive. These countries were of the view that at the bare minimum, ASEAN should 
reflect the position agreed in February 2016, as articulated in the AMM Retreat Press 
Release and the Sunnylands Declaration,20 as reiterating respect to legal processes 
was not the same as taking sides in the dispute. On the other hand, other members 
took the position that a reference to the award would undermine the strategic relations 
of ASEAN-China, increase the tension hence deteriorate further the situation on the 
ground as it is clear that PCA is a big setback for China. As a result, the absence of 
meaningful mention on the PCA in a way confirmed the chair’s irrelevance to advance 
its position against China, let alone for ASEAN to resolve the issue. The issuance of 
a standalone statement pushed and initiated by Indonesia on Statement on the 
Maintenance of Peace, Security, and Stability in the Region said nothing other than 
Indonesia’s attempt to manifest leadership through the reiteration of commitments of 
ASEAN in maintaining a peaceful and stable region in light of the issuance of the 
arbitral award, although no specific reference made in the final text of the statement. 
                                                      
20 Personal communication, 23 November 2017 
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It is unclear then for Lao PDR, as a chair, in showcasing its capacity as the chair as 
there was no significant move undertaken. 
Overall policy 
South China Sea, amidst the supposedly changing status quo with the tribunal 
award, did not seem to get the place it deserved in 2016. Consensus was difficult to 
achieve in 2016 proven by the course of events taking place in order to finalise ASEAN 
outcome documents, as well as the irony that the preferred language to be cited is 
originating from a political statement with an external party (the Sunnylands ASEAN-
US declaration). It could only be assumed that the preservation of special relations of 
Lao PDR and China played a major role behind Lao PDR’s operationalisation of 
chairmanship. Analysing Lao PDR’s chairmanship with the mandate, resources and 
constraints triangle, this is the sharpest country among the three that has proven how 
national interest played the most prominent role above all considerations. It held 
strongly to its formal power in operationalising its resources based on cost-benefit 
basis, not putting its relationship with China at stake, resulting in an inefficient mandate 
undertaking. However, it managed to fully employ its resources through utilisation of 
other members, for example, Indonesia’s initiative on the issuance of additional 
statement. 
 
II.4 ASEAN Centrality through ASEAN chairmanship in South China Sea  
In general, ASEAN chair bears three main duties/responsibilities formally: (a) a 
spokeperson; (b) a ‘chief executive’ in chairing and facilitating official meeting; and (c) 
tabling new initiatives and programmes to advance regional cooperation (Mun, 2016). 
These functions are built upon carrying out ASEAN perpetual agenda of community 
building with keeping the region’s peace and stability at the heart of the process. A 
chairing country is the face of ASEAN during its assumption of chairmanship. 
Other than the three abovementioned, it is the chair’s informal role as a 
consensus-builder that is most important but often overlooked. The assumption of the 
role of the chair means that a country has to put its national interest with regional 
interests in an equal state; it wears both national and regional hats, in which the latter 
comes with the trust of member states which affect how the chair gains resource 
capitals from its supporters. Putting regional concerns in favour of national’s is key to 
ASEAN’s centrality; nevertheless, this is where the real challenge remains: given 
ASEAN’s high value of unanimity, it is very easy for the members to always fall back 
on common denominator, water down significant achievements through some 
unnoticed paragraphs in a political document as the easiest way to discharge their 
responsibilities. 
However, each chair might find, or create within their chairmanship period, a 
leeway to exploit opportunities in favour of its national interest. While it seems vain or 
shallow to judge the chair’s intention through what seem like mundane, pre-written 
political statements, there is a merit in this: it reflects how ASEAN’s habitus of 
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diplomacy and policy making is embodied through the control of the chair. Myanmar 
had done a brilliant job throughout the issuance of standalone FM statement as well 
as inclusion of South China Sea in the Nay Pyi Taw Declaration (that is not part of an 
annual outcome documents), giving South China Sea the attention it deserved given 
the then escalating conditions. This was in parallel with the relatively recent 2011 
reformation carried out by Myanmar. Meanwhile, Malaysia was low profile and keeping 
the status quo, while successfully allocated its resources in formal establishment of 
ASEAN Community 2015 that “saved” the country from critics towards the stagnancy 
in South China Sea issue. To this end, Malaysia secured both its alliance to China and 
ASEAN. Lao PDR, on the other hand, clearly avoid any advancement in resolving 
South China Sea and to some extent, adopted something that is less than neutral in 
projecting ASEAN’s position in this issue. The three countries’ chairmanship conduct 
is summarised as follows: 
 
It is important to note that for all of the chairs, non-interference remain the 
formal constraint/true rule of the game in carrying out their tasks. In practice, non-
interference offers both internal and external uses with an overarching purpose: ”… to 
stabilise the prevailing domestic order in line with the interests underpinning specific 
domestic’s interest and to limit the scope of this contestation to a level where it could 
be managed and overcome by the forces dominating ASEAN states” (Jones L. , 2011). 
In this regard, non-interference is always deployed very selectively and contextually 
which inarguably affect how ASEAN’s stance is projected outwardly. The practice of 
non-interference is, therefore, determined by the melting pot of interests and concerns 
of ASEAN’s dominant leads, or in this case, the chair. It shows how ASEAN 
regionalism does not operate independently or merely based on the underlying 
principles; rather, its operation provides a room to alter state’s behaviour and a 
country’s interest. Its operation is also determined by the broader social relations 
between and among the chairs, ASEAN members and China in this case. 
While non-interference does work its magic for ASEAN, it is very often makes 
ASEAN seems as rather inefficient in dealing with challenges as its non-interference 
and other principles limit the organisation in formulating certain move pertaining to 
issues that stems domestically but could bring larger effect regionally (Ba, 2010). 
Institutional 
dimension 
Myanmar Malaysia Lao PDR 
Mandate Efficient and inefficient: 
first time chairing, 
appropriation 
Efficient Inefficient 
Resource Formal and legitimacy by 
social acceptance 
Formal power Formal power, 
social support by 
external factor 
Constraint Operating norms through 
issuance of additional 
documents 
ASEAN community 
establishment being a 
favourable condition 
Informal norms 
(social control), 
cost benefit 
basis 
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ASEAN’s security approach still tend to be traditional in character as they are focused 
and directed around the preservation of mainly states’ sovereignties, even though 
present ASEAN has incorporated a great deal of non-traditional security in its agenda 
or as ASEAN would call it, comprehensive approach to security.21 Hence, the 
utilisation of this principle as a regional identity very much depends on a country’s 
preference. 
 What is important to scrutinized, then, is what goes beyond the nitty-gritty of 
chairmanship conduct or what is the unseen; that ASEAN’s chairmanship and conduct 
as a whole should be seen more than ASEAN’s regularity and mundanity; behind the 
agenda setting, ad-hoc meetings to be convened, additional statements issued, it is 
an embodiment of political commitment as a group empowered by national identities. 
Further, it should be noted that ASEAN machinery is being operated by hundreds of 
organs under FM/Leaders level, for example the senior officials meeting among the 
most prominent which are the people who actually formulate and finalise the political 
documents. Analysis on the dynamics at this layer would require a whole new thesis, 
however it is important to note that chair’s preferences are not limited to material self-
benefits associated with a particular negotiating output; they can be also related with 
a personal normative interest and/or attachment to specific issue, e.g. increased 
political status and better career prospects. 
If, ASEAN and its non-interference principle are “…best understood as a means 
by which ruling forces sought to impose their preferred vision of domestic order on 
their societies” (Jones L. , 2011), then the importance of national identities are on-
point. This is the underlying pattern of national vis-à-vis regional identities. As Acharya 
noted, while a principle has the effect of appropriating and restraining state behaviour, 
it also goes as far as “redefining state interests and creating collective interests and 
identities” (Acharya, 2014). Hence, the meaning of ASEAN as well as ASEAN’s 
regional identity evolves continuously for and driven by its own members. This way, 
ASEAN agenda would not overlap the continuing efforts of its members to define their 
own national identities and hence, interests.  
This issue, along with the analysis, also serves as a reflection on how ASEAN 
positions itself, consciously or unconsciously, in the global architecture. It is a possible 
presumption that, maintaining status quo with China is preferred by ASEAN so as to 
retain their status as middle power, contain major power’s interest in the region and 
remain relevant, hence, ASEAN centrality; to this end, ASEAN’s position is 
consistently inconsistent. Stubbs pointed out that none of the ASEAN members can 
be considered a major economic or military power, yet through ASEAN they gain a 
prominent position being in the core of the advancement of East Asian regionalism 
(Stubbs, 2014). Middle power theory emphasises that great powers have limited 
capability in creating an international order juxtaposed with the curb posed by middle 
powers; to this end, ASEAN regionalism on its internal interaction and its role of 
                                                      
21 See ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together: http://www.asean.org/storage/2015/12/ASEAN-2025-Forging-
Ahead-Together-final.pdf  
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regional leadership contributes to geopolitical stability through limiting major powers 
interests and putting Southeast Asia region at the centre (Egberink, 2011). Hence, this 
helps in explaining contemporary international politics in the region and wider scope. 
After all, ASEAN centrality is really about the larger dynamics of regionalism and 
regional architecture in the Asia Pacific and how ASEAN could remain relevant 
(Acharya, 2017). To some extent, this also reinforces regional identity for ASEAN as 
a collective as well as certain member states that maximise ASEAN as the platform to 
leverage their positions on this matter. 
As ASEAN itself is a conduit for collective statecraftmanship, realisation of 
policies in engaging major powers and instrument to bring about a regional 
architecture driven by ASEAN centrality, so does its chairmanship serve: it is a conduit 
through which extant understandings and perceptions towards one’s national vis-à-vis 
regional identities are reformulated and operationalised. National identity, here, proves 
its prominence; identity is not merely a vague, floating concept. It is a signifier; what 
makes them part of ASEAN and what makes them different from the other. This is 
even more significant given ASEAN’s aspiration to form a common Southeast Asian 
identity. To this end, the three chairmanships could be summed up by the phrase of 
“different, but the same”; to certain degree, the three countries favour their national 
identities in forming their regional identities. The hat of being Burmese, Malaysian and 
Laotian are prominent and not putting what they have at stake. However, they 
manoeuvred this in a different way under the cover of ASEAN’s norms and principles. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCLUSION 
I start with outlining how ASEAN, in addition to contemporary analysis of 
ASEAN vis-à-vis international architecture, is very much influenced by its members’ 
respective national identities. In order to understand such claim, ASEAN’s position on 
South China Sea issue is taken as a case in which the organisation’s inconsistent 
position over the years is highly determined by the leadership of ASEAN Chair. This 
is a rigid testament to ASEAN centrality. The three ASEAN chairs on case displayed 
differing leadership style which affect the outcome of the organisation’s negotiation, 
notwithstanding the rule of game which is ASEAN’s underlying principles such as non-
interference. 
From ASEAN’s outcome documents which are issued annually as the result of 
its Leaders’ Summit and Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, subtle hints on the organisation’s 
stance were apparent throughout the statements in which the tone of neutrality or 
aggressiveness was expressed in slightly different ways. Though all statements 
registered concerns over the issue, the degree of importance could be found in the 
use of clause such as “the”, “an”, “adoption” and “conclusion” in referring to the COC 
which is widely known as the main goal of ASEAN’s effort in resolving the territorial 
dispute with China; direct and non-direct reference on the issue of South China Sea; 
as well as inclusion and/or exclusion of issues that are considered as “the elephant in 
the room” such as the PCA ruling. 
This thesis holds the view that the way a country chairs the organisation, 
through its policy and conduct, is affected by the country’s national identity. National 
identity, in this thesis, is seen under the paradigm of a country’s political conduct, 
culture and international position/view which helps to understand how a country 
perceives itself inwardly and positions itself outwardly. ASEAN’s norms and principles, 
which are translated as its regional identity, remain the same for the three countries 
and differ in utilisation. Myanmar’s ‘vulnerable’ national identity was in juxtaposition 
with its commitment of upholding regional identity as it undertook the responsibility of 
chairing ASEAN for the first time; Malaysia, with its strong “Malay-ness” as one of the 
founding fathers of ASEAN, smartly navigated what to surface and what not to surface 
during its leadership particularly with maximising the momentum of ASEAN 
Community establishment in 2015; and Lao PDR, with its geographical uniqueness 
and history that determine how the country pretty much positions itself, strongly leaned 
against ASEAN’s neutrality amidst pressure from its fellow ASEAN members. Their 
respective national identities also affect the way they see, interpret and use their 
relations within and with ASEAN. It is important to note, however, there is no clear cut 
on ASEAN’s or the chair’s policy; they are interwoven and could not be translated as 
‘policy’ in definite, since for ASEAN it is ‘merely’ a position, not a policy.  
While these were factual results of the Chairmanships, it should be noted that 
complex negotiations took place among ASEAN Member States which affected the 
chair’s conducts utilising various resources, capitals, ways and means around the 
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chair’s mandates under the constraint of ASEAN’s credo of consultation-and-
consensus decision making and non-interference on other countries’ internal affairs. 
All in all, the struggles faced by the three ASEAN chairs to balance national and 
regional interests have caused ASEAN’s inconsistent behaviour on the South China 
Sea issue, rooted in their footing of respective national identities and convoluted by 
the conflicting attitude between ASEAN’s informality and institutionalisation as well as 
between the countries’ long term economic and security interests, either bilaterally or 
multilaterally.  
Both ASEAN, as an organisation, and its chairmanship which spearheads the 
organisation’s move, serve as collective statecraft and policy orientations; for 
engaging major powers and designing regional architecture reformulation and 
operationalisation of national and regional identities, under ASEAN’s informal 
regionalism as the underlying rule of game. To this end, it is imperative to note that 
national and regional identities are not a fluid conception. Rather, they form an ongoing 
process with no end which act and react on each other in complex and continually 
shifting dynamics. The meaning of ASEAN evolves continuously for and driven by its 
own members which makes ASEAN would not hinder the efforts of its members to 
define their own national identities and interests. This cumulating process has resulted 
in ASEAN being a middle power in Asia-Pacific which helps to preserve geopolitical 
stability as it limits major powers’ role in the region emphasising ASEAN centrality. 
Given that it is incumbent upon the ASEAN chair to safeguard ASEAN centrality, and 
as this thesis has demonstrated, the role of ASEAN chair will inarguably remain 
imperious for ASEAN modalities and for ASEAN to remain relevant. 
 
 
***
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APPENDIX I: Matrix of National Identities 
 
                                                      
22 (Steinberg, 2010); (Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014); (Galache, 2014); (Dittmer, 2010); (Jönsson, 2010)  
23 (Nelson, Meerman, & Embong, 2008); (Baginda, 2016); (Jogulu & Ferkins, 2012); (Hutchinson, 2014); (Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017) 
24 (Ivarsson, 2008); (Soukamneuth, 2006) 
25 (Martin, 2010); (Wenjuan, 2017); (Lihua, 2013); (Curtis, 2016); (Cohen, 2014); (Banwo, 2015) 
National 
identity: 
unit 
Myanmar (2014)22 Malaysia (2015)23 Lao PDR (2016)24 China25 
Political 
system 
• Parliamentary 
government led by a 
military-backed 
political party 
• Party/key agency: 
Union Solidarity and 
Development Party 
(USDP) 
 
• Federal constitutional 
monarchy with a system of 
parliamentary democracy. 
• A centralisation trend 
incorporating market-
oriented principles with 
substantial state 
intervention. 
• Key agencies/actors: 
United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO), 
Barisan Nasional, Mahathir 
Mohamad 
• Socialist communist: 
socialisme à la laotienne 
(Lao-style socialism) 
• Divergent socialist 
trajectory: market 
liberalization, socialist 
transformation and capitalist 
incorporation 
• Party/key agencies: Lao 
People’s Revolutionary 
Party (LPRP), Lao 
Communist Party 
 
• Unitary one-party socialist 
republic 
• Main political structure 
consists of two interrelated 
institutions in-charge of 
decision making: “the party” 
and “the state/government”: 
the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), commanded 
by the Party Politburo and 
its Standing Committee; 
and the state government, 
headed by the premier, who 
leads the State 
Council/cabinet. 
National 
culture: 
official 
languages, 
religions, 
ethnic 
groups, 
• Theravada Buddhism 
• Close relationship 
between religion and 
political power 
• Political monks and 
nationalist movement 
• Truly Malaysian campaign 
• Bahasa Malay 
• Ethnicisation; Malay, 
Chinese, Indian, and 
others/ Bumiputera and the 
non-Bumiputera / Malay 
• French occupation 
• National Buddhist religion 
• New national history for 
Laos: the importance of 
ethnic minorities in 
portrayals of the people, 
drawing on historical 
• Confucianism, focuses on 
the cultivation of virtues and 
the maintenance of ethics 
• Courtesy stresses modesty 
and prudence 
• 56 ethnic groups with Han 
domination 
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historical 
experiences 
• Multi ethnics: 1982 
Citizenship Act on 
official ethnics 
• British occupation 
• India influence during 
British annexation 
 
Bumiputera and non-Malay 
Bumiputera 
• Muslim domination  
• British occupation 
conditions of nation-building 
and the struggle against the 
outer enemies 
• Standardisation of Lao 
language 
• Lao/Thai trajectory 
International 
status/view, 
including 
foreign policy 
• Independent and non-
aligned  
• Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-
existence 
• ASEAN as a 
cornerstone 
• Geographical factors 
(India and China) and 
economic and social 
change pressure 
• Influenced and shaped by 
three key factors: location 
in Southeast Asia, its 
attributes as a trading 
nation as well as its 
demography. 
• ASEAN as a cornerstone 
 
• Landlocked, dominated by 
big neighbors (China, 
Thailand, Viet Nam), makes 
it highly reliant on foreign 
donors.  
• A foreign policy of peace, 
“independence, friendship 
and non-alignment”  
• Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence 
• Reclaiming its rightful 
position as regional leader, 
and sees its actions as 
those of a benevolent elder 
to be respected. 
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APPENDIX II: Matrix of ASEAN Outcome Documents26 
 
Outcome 
Documents27 
Myanmar (2014) Malaysia (2015) Lao PDR (2016) 
Formulation, mentioning of China and South China Sea, inclusion of sensitive phrase and issuance of additional statement outside the 
annuals 
ASEAN Summit 24th Summit Chairman’s Statement (May 
2014) 
• Serious concerns over the on-going 
developments in the South China Sea; 
• Full and effective implementation of the 
DOC in its entirety; 
• The universally recognized principles of 
international law, including the 1982 
UNCLOS; 
• An early conclusion of the COC. 
25th Summit Chairman’s Statement 
(November 2014) 
• Remained concerned over the situation 
in the South China Sea; 
• The universally recognised principles of 
international law, including the 1982 
UNCLOS  
26th Summit, April 2015 
• Serious concerns expressed by some 
Leaders on the land reclamation being 
undertaken in the South China Sea; 
• Instructed Foreign Ministers to 
urgently address this matter 
constructively including under the 
various ASEAN frameworks such as 
ASEAN-China relations, as well as the 
principle of peaceful co-existence;  
• Full and effective implementation of 
the DOC in its entirety; 
• International law including the 1982 
UNCLOS; 
• Intensify the consultations on the COC 
to ensure the expeditious 
establishment of an effective COC. 
 
  
28th and 29th Summit 
• Seriously concerned over 
recent and ongoing 
developments 
• Took note of the concerns 
expressed by some Leaders on 
the land reclamations and 
escalation of activities in the 
area 
• International law, including the 
1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS).  
• Importance of non-militarisation 
and self-restraint in the conduct 
of all activities, including land 
reclamation that could further 
complicate the situation and 
                                                      
26 Italic is added 
27 Omission: ASEAN Regional Forum (due to China being one of the participants), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (chaired by other line ministry) and SOM on DOC (chaired 
by country coordinator) 
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• The principles as contained in the DOC, 
ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the 
South China Sea, the JS of the 15th 
ASEAN China Summit on the 10th 
Anniversary of the DOC and the related 
ASEAN Statements adopted during the 
24th ASEAN Summit.  
• Intensify consultations with China on 
measures and mechanism to ensure and 
further enhance the full and effective 
implementation of the DOC in its 
entirety, and on the early conclusion of 
COC 
• More early harvest measures  
• The importance of the collective 
commitments of ASEAN Member States 
to peace, stability, maritime security and 
mutual trust in the region and the need 
to create conditions conducive for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes.  
27th Summit, November 2015 
• Shared the concerns expressed by 
some Leaders on the increased 
presence of military assets and the 
possibility of further militarisation of 
outposts in the South China Sea; 
• Full and effective implementation of 
the DOC in its entirety; 
• Urged that consultations be intensified 
to ensure the expeditious 
establishment of an effective COC; 
• Emphasised the importance for the 
states concerned to resolve their 
differences and disputes through 
peaceful means, in accordance with 
international law including 1982 
UNCLOS. 
 
escalate tensions in the South 
China Sea.  
• Importance of the full and 
effective implementation of the 
DOC in its entirety 
• Early adoption of an effective 
COC; 
• Importance of undertaking 
confidence building and 
preventive measures to 
enhance, among others, trust 
and confidence amongst 
parties.  
 
ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers 
Meeting 
47th AMM Joint Communique, August 2014 
• Remained seriously concerned over 
recent developments which had 
increased tensions in the South China 
Sea 
• Universally recognised principles of 
international law, including the 1982 
UNCLOS.  
• ASEAN's Six Point Principles on the 
South China Sea, the 2012 Joint 
48th AMM Joint Communique, August 
2015 
• Remained seriously concerned over 
recent and ongoing developments in 
the area;  
• Took note of the serious concerns 
expressed by some Ministers on the 
land reclamations in the South China 
Sea; 
49th AMM Joint Communique, July 
2016 
• Seriously concerned over 
recent and ongoing 
developments and took note of 
the concerns expressed by 
some Ministers on the land 
reclamations and escalation of 
activities in the area 
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Statement of the 15th ASEAN-China 
summit on the 10th Anniversary of the 
DOC, and the ASEAN Foreign Minister’s 
Statement on the Current Developments 
in the South China Sea on 10 May 2014.  
• Intensify consultations with China on 
measures and mechanisms to ensure 
and further enhance the full and effective 
implementation of the DOC in its 
entirety, particularly Articles 4 and 5 as 
well as substantive negotiations for the 
early conclusion of the Code of Conduct 
in the South China Sea (COC).  
• A series of early-harvest measures.  
• Noted the c 
• Full and effective implementation of 
the DOC in its entirety; 
• Universally recognised principles of 
international law, including the 1982 
UNCLOS; 
• Effective implementation of the 
agreed Early Harvest Measures;  
• The importance of expeditious 
establishment of an effective COC; 
• Preventive measures should be 
undertaken to address developments 
in the South China Sea, with the 
objective, among others, to enhance 
trust and confidence amongst parties.  
• Took note of Indonesia’s proposal to 
establish a hotline of communications 
at the high level in the government 
between ASEAN and China to 
address emergency situations on the 
ground; 
• The Philippines briefed the Meeting on 
further developments including 
matters particularly relating to the 
1982 UNCLOS. 
• International law, including the 
1982 UNCLOS  
• Early adoption of an effective 
COC 
• Implementation of the DOC in 
its entirety as well as 
substantive negotiations for the 
early conclusion of the COC. 
 
Additional 
documents 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the 
Current Developments in the South China 
Sea, 10 May 2014 
• Serious concerns over the on-going 
developments in the South China Sea 
N/A FM Statement on the Maintenance 
of Peace, Security, and Stability in 
the Region, July 2016 
• reaffirm ASEAN’s common 
position in the Joint 
Communiqué of the 49th AMM; 
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• Universally recognised principles of 
international law, including the 1982 
UNCLOS 
• ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the 
South China Sea  
• Full and effective implementation of the 
DOC and an early conclusion of the 
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea 
(COC).  
 
Nay Pyi Taw Declaration on Realisation of 
the ASEAN Community by 2015, 11 May 
2014  
 
• To strengthen cooperation for the full 
and effective implementation of DOC, in 
accordance with universally recognized 
principles of international law including 
the 1982 UNCLOS, especially calling on 
all parties to exercise self-restraint and 
non-use of force, as well as refrain from 
taking actions that would further escalate 
tension and to work towards an early 
conclusion of the COC as reflected in the 
ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the 
South China Sea. 
• Exercise self-restraint and 
refrain from activities that might 
raise tension in the region 
Remarks: 
pro/against 
ASEAN 
neutrality/China? 
Neutral to against – internal, domestic 
reform, strong commitment as a chair 
Neutral – too many to jeopardize, 
increasing relations with China 
Orientating towards China, leaning 
against ASEAN neutrality 
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APPENDIX III: Chairmanships’ logo, theme and priorities 
 
            Myanmar           Malaysia       Lao PDR 
 
Priorities 
Myanmar Malaysia Lao PDR 
• To formulate ASEAN Community Post-
2015 Vision collectively; 
• To promote small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) as prime movers of 
ASEAN’s economic development in 
21st century; 
• To complete the Roadmap for an 
ASEAN Community (2009-2015) and 
establish the ASEAN Community by the 
end of the year; 
• Implementation of the ASEAN 
Community Vision 2025 and its 
Blueprints; 
• Narrowing Development Gap, including 
the finalisation of the Initiative for 
ASEAN Integration (IAI) Work Plan III; 
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• To address narrowing the 
development gaps within and among 
Member States; 
• To promote the Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity that will also 
incorporate connectivity with our 
external partners; 
• To seriously consider the sustainable 
development; 
• To address the growing trend of aging 
population; 
• To promote resilience in addressing 
crisis and disasters; 
• To take a balanced approach in 
expansion of relations with its Dialogue 
Partners; and 
• To set expectations aimed at 
achievable results. 
• To develop and finalise the ASEAN 
Community’s Post-2015 Vision and 
attendant documents; 
• To bring ASEAN closer to the people; 
• To strengthen SMEs; 
• To expand intra-ASEAN trade and 
investment; 
• To strengthen ASEAN institutions by 
implementing the recommendations by 
the High Level Task Force on the 
Strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat 
and Reviewing the ASEAN Organs; 
• To promote peace and security through 
moderation; and 
• To enhance ASEAN’s role as a global 
player, through, among others, having 
an ASEAN’s response to urgent 
situations of common interest and 
concern. 
• Trade Facilitation; 
• Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development; 
• Tourism Development; 
• Connectivity, including the finalisation 
of the Post-2015 Agenda for ASEAN 
Connectivity; 
• Vientiane Declaration on Decent Work 
Promotion: Informal Economy in 
ASEAN; and 
• Enhance Regional Cooperation for the 
Preservation, Protection and Promotion 
of ASEAN Cultural Heritage. 
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